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THE RELEVANCE OF OPTION VALUE IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Stephen 0. Reiling and Mark W. Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
Option value has been the subject of considerable debate in the
economic literature since it was first introduced by Weisbrod [1964].
This debate is of importance because of its implications to public
investment decision criteria, particularly when they are applied to the
trade-off between the preservation and development of a natural
resource or area. These decisions often produce heated public
discussion, such as those surrounding the Tellico Dam
snail darter
controversy and the construction of a hydroelectric dam in the Hell's
Canyon.
It has been argued that option value should be included in benefit/
cost calculations to measure the "true" costs of development. That is,
option value should be an addition to the negative benefits associated
with development or, conversely, a positive addition to preservation
benefits. Inclusion of option value in benefit/cost calculations would
result in more conservative investment decisions by reducing the
benefit/cost ratio of many development projects. Hence, it provides a
theoretical justification for arguing against many development projects
on the grounds of economic efficiency, which is the cornerstone of
public investment criteria.
While the conceptual importance of option value seemed clear to the
early writers on the subject, operationalization of the concept through
measurement has never occurred. Measurement has only been addressed at
a theoretical level. The central issue revolves around the difference
between option value and expected consumer's surplus. At least one
writer argued that the two concepts were one and the same, while others
have "shown" that option value is greater than or less than expected
consumer's surplus. All in all, this debate has raised questions about
the validity and importance of \he concept. Some writers have abandoned
it while others have continued to defend it.
•Assistant Professor and Research Associate, respectively, Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maine at Orono.
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We have two objectives in this report. The first is to review the
concept of option value and determine the conditions that are necessary
for its existence. This is a necessary prerequisite to the second
objective, which is to examine the literature related to its measurement
and draw conclusions about the importance and relevance of the concept.
In essence, this publication represents a review and a critical
re-evaluation of the literature dealing with option value. This
literature is rich and dynamic, and provides a fascinating sequence of
articles, comments, and rebuttals. Re-evaluation of the concept
requires a rather comprehensive review of this literature, which is
something that has not been provided to date. The literature review is
also important because the work of some authors has been systematically
overlooked in the course of the debate. As a result of this oversight,
the original formulation of the concept continues to be cited in the
literature [see, for example, Freeman 1979] even though its practical
significance is doubtful. Considerable confusion has also arisen
between option value and the newer concept of an "irreversibility effect"
(see below). This "irreversibility effect" has been called quasi-option
value and even the "true option value." The discussion in this paper is
limited to Weisbrod's original concept as it evolved, which we feel
should be termed option value. Other distinct concepts should be given
different names in order to prevent confusion.
THE NATURE OF OPTION VALUE
The initial formulation of option value was developed by Weisbrod
[1964] in the form of "option demand." He observed that individual
consumption goods may possess public good attributes. The public good
characteristic stems from the existence of "option demand" or the
willingness of rational "economic men" to pay for the option of
consuming the good or service at some time in the future.
The concept can be best illustrated with an example. To follow
Weisbrod, we can envisage a privately owned park encompassing a unique
resource (such as Sequoia National Park) and the owner exercises perfect
price discrimination. In addition, there are no externalities that
distort the allocative decision. Under these conditions, if revenues
collected by a perfectly discriminating monopolist fall short of costs,
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"... allocative efficiency considerations would indicate "closing" the
park, assuming that private and social rates of discount are equal"
[Weisbrod 1964, p. 472]. However, Weisbrod argued that because the
owner is unable to charge potential users who value the option to use
the park in the future, this private decision may be inefficient from
society's perspective. There are, in essence, external economies of
current production that result in the free rider effect commonly
associated with collective goods. "In the interests of economic
efficiency, it would be desirable to keep the firm in business if the
total of fees potentially collectable from current consumers and fees
potentially collectable from prospective future consumers -- including
those who, in fact, will not become consumers — are adequate to cover
costs" [Weisbrod 1964, p. 473].
Whenever the firm's expected revenue (exclusive of option revenue)
exceeds expected costs, the option demand of people who may use the park
in the future is always satisfied. That is, provision of the good or
service satisfies the public good aspect reflected by option demand.
Since part of the firm's output has public good characteristics, a
public subsidy may be justified on efficiency grounds when one considers
the willingness to pay of consumers who may never visit the site but who
still value the option to visit in the future. Subsidization is
obviously only necessary in the case of the "sub-marginal" producer
whose expected revenue from actual visitors does not cover costs. If
revenues plus the willingness to pay for the option are less than costs,
a subsidy would not be justified and efficiency criteria would indicate
that the firm should shut down.
Weisbrod indicated that option demand exists for all goods. However, he set forth two conditions that must exist for option demand to
be "significant." These are: 1) infrequency and uncertainty of
purchase, and 2) very high costs of increasing production once it has
been curtailed.— Weisbrod argued that frequently-purchased goods (and
hence a high degree of certainty associated with their purchase) for
-Actually, a third condition is that the good or service in question is
nonstorable. That is, it is not possible to purchase the commodity
now and store it for later consumption [Weisbrod 1964, p. 472].
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which output expansion is less costly will have insignificant option
value.

So the difference between private goods with significant option

demand and those without is a matter of degree, not of kind.
Weisbrod's original exposition did not explicitly focus on its
impact on public investment criteria. Instead, it illustrated the
potential existence of option demand for all private (market and nonmarket) goods. However, its implications for public resource development projects are obvious. If a development project under consideration
results in the destruction of a natural environment, the potential
revenue or value of that environment to current users would underestimate the "true" value. The potential revenue that non-users would
be willing to pay to retain the option to use the area in the future
should be included to reflect the "true" value of the natural environment. Krutilla [1967] was one of the first writers to illustrate this
point.
The notion that option value may exist for all goods could be
important in attempts to operationalize the concept of option value for
use in public investment decisions. The decision concerning which
benefits are lost or gained in terms of option value would require a
determination of whether the purchase (or use) of the commodity (or
resource) was infrequent enough and its output expansion costly enough
to warrant the addition of an option value to the calculation. Recognizing that an option demand exists for all commodities, the chore becomes
one of determining whether this demand is of significant value.
The existence of option value for all goods and services raises
another question relative to benefit/cost analysis not generally
confronted in the literature. If there is an option value attached to
natural resources destroyed by a project, is there not also an option
value attached to the output of that project? Again, the problem
becomes one of determining whether this value is significant.
The first reaction to Weisbrod's formulation of option demand came
from Long [1967]. His comment focused on two issues: 1) the conditions
required for option value to exist, and 2) the relationship between
option value and consumer's surplus. With regard to the first, he
suggests that infrequency of purchase is irrelevant and that indivisibility and heterogeneity of the commodity or resource are the conditions
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that produce option demand. "If the product is divisible and sold under
competitive conditions, the market will give the right allocation without any government subsidy for option value ... Option value ... is
only of importance for ... a commodity for which there is no good
substitute" [Long 1967, p. 352]. Hence, uniqueness of the product or
resource is a necessary condition for Long's interpretation of option
demand.
Examination of the examples used by Weisbrod to illustrate the
nature of option value suggests that he implicitly acknowledged the
importance of uniqueness as a condition for option demand to be
significant. For example, the park example discussed above explicitly
assumed that the park contained a unique resource
large Sequoia trees.
His other examples, hospitals and urban transit systems, both imply a
substantial degree of uniqueness. In fact, there may not be any
substitutes available for the services provided by either of these
facilities in many communities. Hence, it seems that uniqueness is an
important condition for the presence of a significant option demand.
That is, option value is positively related to the level of uniqueness
of the product or resource. In terms of resource development projects,
unique natural resource environments that would be destroyed by
development would have a high option value whereas non-unique environments would not. Likewise, project outputs would produce significant
option demand only if they are unique.
Long also disagreed with Weisbrod's other necessary condition for
option value: "Weisbrod's conditions on costs (of increasing
production once it has been curtailed) has nothing to do with the
problem; it simply says that it is important to make correct decisions
when the costs of reversing wrong ones are large" [Long 1967, p. 352].
Therefore, uniqueness (and, presumably, non-storability) are the only
conditions necessary for the existence of option value according to
Long.
Long also addressed the distinction between option value and
consumer's surplus. Weisbrod's analysis indicated that option value was
an additional value that was separate and distinct from consumer's
surplus. For example, option value was separate from and in addition
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to the potential revenue that could be collected from users by a
perfectly discriminating monopolist. The latter revenue, by definition,
captures all consumer's surplus. But it fails to capture the revenue
that potential users would pay for options to consume the product in
the future, i.e., the option value.
Long [1967, p. 351] challenged this contention and argued that
"option value is the unrecognized son of that old goat, consumer's
surplus." Hence, "option value must be used in place of and not in
addition to ... consumer's surplus"
Although Weisbrod did not respond to Long's comments, Lindsay
[1964] defended Weisbrod's position on this latter point. Lindsay
reemphasized the condition of uncertainty and compared option value to
an insurance premium. "In the case of option demand, what is desired
to be purchased is relief from the uncertainty that capacity or stocks
will be insufficient to satisfy a later demand" [Lindsay 1967, p. 345].
He concludes that option value is different than consumer's surplus
since the former exists for goods consumed in the uncertain future and
the latter pertains to the certain present. The implicit conclusion is
that option value is separate from, and in addition to, consumer's
surplus.
Lindsay's reference to uncertainty is somewhat different than
Weisbrod's in that Lindsay emphasizes uncertainty of future supply while
Weisbrod emphasizes uncertainty of future demand or purchase. We
believe this distinction is important and view uncertainty of purchase
as the critical condition for the existence of option value. If an
individual knows for certain that he will not demand the good in the
future, he would not be willing to pay anything for the option,

II

regardless of the degree of supply uncertainty.—
In addition, if a
person knows that he will demand the good in the future, the appropriate
measure of his potential loss due to supply uncertainty is the reduction
— That person may have an "existence demand," however. Existence demand
represents the value of the good to a person even though he or she will
never purchase it. It represents the increase in utility that people
receive from knowing that something exists even though they never will
consume the good. Existence demand is distinct from option demand.
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in his expected consumer's surplus. Therefore, we believe that
uncertainty of purchase rather than uncertainty of supply is a critical
condition for the presence of option value.
Although supply uncertainty is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for option value, it seems to be related to the concept in two
ways. First, a high level of supply uncertainty may induce potential
users to accurately articulate their option value and contribute
revenue in the hope of insuring future provision of the good. That is,
a high degree of supply uncertainty would jeopardize their free rider
position. On the other hand, one would hypothesize that potential users
would discount their value of the option in proportion to the level of
supply uncertainty. The degree to which potential users believe that
the sum of revenue raised from the sale of options would not be
sufficient to guarantee future provision would influence their value of
the option. This suggests that supply uncertainty may influence the
magnitude of option value as well as the willingness of potential users
to articulate their option value. But it is not a necessary condition
for the existence of option value.
A summary of the above discussion may be useful. Option demand
(or value) can be defined as the amount a consumer who is not currently
consuming the good would be willing to pay to retain the option to
purchase the good at the prevailing price at some time in the future.
Whether or not the consumer ever exercises the option is irrelevant so
long as he is willing to pay a positive sum of money for the option.
We believe that four conditions must exist for option demand to be
significant: 1) uncertainty of purchase, 2) nonstorability of the
good, 3) a unique quality of the good (no good substitutes exist), and
4) the cost of increasing (recommencing) production once it has been
curtailed (stopped) is extremely high.
With regard to the last condition, we support Weisbrod rather than
Long. If this condition did not exist, occasional demanders of the
product could be accommodated without extreme difficulty and there would
be no need for potential users to purchase an option. We also disagree
with Long's contention that option value is nothing more than expected
consumer's surplus. Under conditions of demand certainty, option value
and expected consumer's surplus are identical. But this ignores the
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basic premise of demand uncertainty that underlies the concept of option
value. We do believe, however, that a relationship exists between
option value and expected consumer's surplus. This will be discussed
in detail in the next section.
THE MEASUREMENT OF OPTION VALUE
The exchange between Long and Lindsay set the stage for the
subsequent debate about the relationship between option value and
consumer's surplus. Some writers argued that option value was separate
and in addition to consumer's surplus, while others contended that the
concepts were the same. Different authors adopted different
conceptual frameworks to "prove" their point. The most striking change
in the debate is that subsequent writers presented more formal and more
rigorous tools to analyze the issue.
Byerlee's Utility Function Approach
Byerlee [1971] was the first to formalize the discussion by
introducing a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function framework. This
formalized the uncertainty of future purchase aspects of option value
emphasized by Lindsay and Weisbrod. Byerlee assumed that the purchase
of an option assures future availability of the good to the owner of the
option while non-purchase precludes future consumption. We will briefly
summarize Byerlee's analysis and then raise a question regarding the
appropriateness of the formulation.
Byerlee presents the following pay-off matrix for the purchase of
an option for good X with the consumer's income, Y. The quantity of X
and Y are measured relative to the consumer's present position and -y
represents the income given up to purchase the option.
Desires to
Purchase X
(SjJ
P^)
Purchase Option (Aj)
Does Not Purchase Option (A-)

Does Not Desire to
Purchase X
(S2)

P

(1-P)

(X, y)
(0, 0)

(0, y)
(0, 0)

The option value problem can be stated in terms of the pay-off
matrix: "find the maximum amount (of income), y d , that the decision
8
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maker would pay for the option of consuming X. That is, we require the
value of y that makes the decision maker indifferent between alternatives A, and A„" [Byerlee 1971, p. 524]. In other words, we want to
solve for the variable y d such that the utility associated with
alternatives A. and A- are equal:
U

(Aj)

U

where U

(A.)

P U (X,

and

(A 2 ) = p U (0, 0) + (1

U

(A 2 )

(1)
yd)

+ (1

p) U (0,
p) U (0,

V

0)

Byerlee then defines the utility of the consumer's present
position to be zero. That is: U (0, 0) 0. This provides the
reference point for comparing other situations with the present
position in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework. This allows us to
rewrite equation (1) as:
P U (X,

y d ) + (1

p) U (0,

yd) = 0

(2)

Two conclusions can be drawn from equation (2). First, by assuming
that (a) the only price the consumer has to pay to consume the good is
the price of the option, and (b) the consumer is certain that he will
consume the good in the future (p
1), equation (2) reduces to:
U (X, y d ) 0
(3)
But, by definition, the consumer's surplus (y ) is equal to:
U (X, y c )
0

(4)

Therefore, y. y . That is, under conditions of certainty of
future purchase, option value and consumer's surplus are identical.
Second, if we assume that the decision maker must pay a price of
y to purchase good X under conditions of uncertainty, equation (2)
becomes:
,
,
P U (X, y c
y d ) + (1 p) U (0, y d )
0
(5)
Since U (X, y c )
0, clearly y d
0. "That is, for a perfectly
discriminating monopolist charging a price that extracts all consumer's
surplus, option demand is zero" [Byerlee 1971, p. 525]. This result
contradicts the conclusion of Weisbrod and others that option demand was
in addition to the revenue that could be collected by a perfectly
3/
discriminating monopolist.-'
3/we challenge Byerlee's conclusion below.
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Byerlee [1971, pp. 526-527] also draws other conclusions about the
relationships between expected consumer's surplus and option value.
These relationships vary with changes in degree of risk aversion adopted
by the consumer and the shape (marginal rate of substitution) of the
consumer's indifference curve for income and good X. He concludes that
risk averse individuals would "discount uncertain gains and pay less
than the expected consumer surplus, and not something additional as
Lindsay claims." He also suggests that expected consumer's surplus and
option demand should be dropped from the economists' vocabulary and be
replaced with a broader definition of consumer's surplus: the amount
of "money a consumer would pay for the right to buy at the current
price something that he is now buying or may buy in the future."
Clearly, Byerlee's article focuses on the nature of the measurement
problem associated with option demand. His results contradict those of
earlier writers, especially Weisbrod and Lindsay who argue that option
value is in addition to the revenue received by a perfectly discriminating monopolist. Although Byerlee's formulation has not been criticized
in the literature, we do not believe his approach "proves" that option
value is zero when a person pays a price for the good that is equal to
his consumer's surplus.
Our challenge stems from the utilities assigned to the cells of the
pay-off matrix; specifically, we disagree with the utility assigned to
the A- Sj cell of the matrix. Byerlee contends that if a person does
not purchase an option but later desires to purchase the good, the
individual suffers no utility loss. That is, his level of utility is
the same as it was at the time he was faced with the decision of whether
or not to purchase the option. In effect, this removes all the
incentive the individual would have to purchase the option. We question
the validity of this reasoning. It seems to us that the individual
would suffer a utility loss (relative to the level at the time the
decision on the option is made) if he chooses to not purchase the
option but then decides at a future time he would like to purchase the
good. That is, the level of utility associated with the A ? S 1 cell
should be less than utility associated with the A„ S„ cell. In the
former case the consumer would like to purchase the good and in the
latter he does not want to purchase the good. We are, however, uncertain
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about the appropriate measure of the magnitude of this loss. Perhaps
it should be equal to the expected value of the consumer's surplus
E(y c ).
If our criticism is correct, it has significant implications
regarding the conclusions of Byerlee. For example, U (A„) would not be
equal to zero; and, the right hand side of Equation (2) would not be
equal to zero. Therefore, one could not conclude that option value was
equal to consumer's surplus under conditions of certainty or that option
value is equal to zero when the good is sold by a perfectly
discriminating monopolist.
The latter point is important since Byerlee contradicts Weisbrod.
We believe that if the A„ S. cell of the matrix accurately reflected
the utility loss the individual would suffer in that situation, it would
be possible for option value to exist over and above the revenue of the
discriminating monopolist. Even a perfectly discriminating monopolist
can only collect revenue from those who actually purchase the good.
Potential users who desire to hedge against the possible utility loss
associated with not being allowed to consume the good in the future may
pay a positive sum for the option. This revenue would be in addition
to the perfectly discriminating revenue received from current users.
Hence, we do not believe Byerlee has adequately demonstrated that
Weisbrod erred in his original argument that option value is an addition
to consumer's surplus in the presence of uncertainty of demand.
Positive Option Value: Circchetti and Freeman Proof
Cicchetti and Freeman [1971] were next to address the relationship
4/
between option value and expected consumer's surplus.- We believe that
our criticism of Byerlee's formulation was recognized by Cicchetti and
Freeman [1971, p. 529] and that it provided a major motivation for their
response:
- T h i s article is a condensation of a more complete treatment of the
subject by Krutilla, Cicchetti, Freeman, and Russell (Krutilla, et al.,
1972). However, we will follow the convention in the literature,
particularly that from RFF, and consider the Cicchetti and Freeman
article as the primary reference. The major difference between the
two is that the more comprehensive article presents the proof in terms
of compensating and equivalent measures, whereas the shorter one
presents only the compensating variation argument. This made no
difference in the authors' conclusions.
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"[Byerlee] concludes that expected consumer's surplus could exceed
the maximum option price a risk averter would pay, i.e., that pure
option value could be negative. His model includes the loss that
an individual would experience if he purchased the option but did
not exercise it ... However, a second kind of loss is also
relevant, the loss associated with not purchasing the option and
later demanding the good but finding it not to be available.
This is a reflection of supply uncertainty as well"— (emphasis
added).
Hence, they also question Byerlee's contention that there is no loss in
utility if a person does not purchase the option, but later demands the
good and is not allowed to purchase it.
Given this background, Cicchetti and Freeman [1971, p. 530] state
their objective unambiguously:
"We will show that where there is uncertainty and individuals are
risk averse, a perfectly discriminating monopolist who can exclude
those who do not pay the option in advance will maximize the
present value of his stream of revenues by selling options to
purchase the good in the future at specified price, and that these
revenues will be greater than the present value of the expected
consumer surpluses. The difference is option value."—'
Cicchetti and Freeman adopt a framework in which the selling
monopolist has a two-part pricing scheme. In the first part the
- W e prefer to refer to this as access uncertainty rather than supply
uncertainty. Option value can exist even in the case of certainty of
future supply (or availability) if only those persons who purchase the
option have the right to access or consumption.
-'Note that, for option value to be positive, the "specified price" at
which the good is sold to option holders is not the perfectly
discriminating price. If an individual knew that the price charged to
consume the good in the future would extract his entire consumer's
surplus, the option to retain (or obtain) the right to purchase the
good would have zero value. This point was illustrated by Zeckhauser
[1969].
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monopolist sells options for future use and charges each purchaser the
maximum he is willing to pay for the option. In the second part, the
monopolist charges a predetermined price when option holders desire
access to the good. The question to be addressed is whether the
maximum price the consumer will pay for the option (OP) is ever greater
than the expected value of his consumer's surplus, E(CS). This
difference, if any, is defined as option value (OV):
OV
OP
E(CS)
(6)
In terms of equation (6), Cicchetti and Freeman "show" that option
value is positive; that is, the price a consumer will pay for the option
is greater than the expected value of his consumer's surplus, given
uncertainty of future demand and high risk averse behavior by the
consumer.
They begin their analysis by looking at the special case of
certainty of future demand, i.e., the probability of future demand,
P (d), is equal to one. They resurrect Byerlee's conclusion by showing
that option price is equal to consumer's surplus under this special
condition. That is:
OP = E(CS) = CS
when P(d) 1
Therefore:
OV
0
This confirms Weisbrod's original contention that uncertainty of future
demand is a necessary condition for the existence of option value.
The second, and major part of their analysis is less straight-forward and less convincing. Figure 1 presents a three-move, eight-outcome
game tree that Cicchetti and Freeman use to accommodate both access and
demand uncertainty in their model. The utilities associated with each
of these outcomes can be ranked, as long as we confine ourselves to
assuming that the consumer either demands or does not demand the good
in the future. Table 1 shows what these two rankings would be. The
logic behind these rankings should be clear. For example, U, is the
utility associated with the free rider phenomenon. Here the consumer
does not buy the option, demands the good, and has it supplied.
Cicchetti and Freeman assume this outcome has a probability of zero (0),
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Buys Option

Demands

Supplied

Not
Supplied

Does Not Buy Option

Does Not
Demand

Supplied

N
<"
Supplied

Demands

Supplied

Does Not
Demand

Not
Supplied

Supplied

TABLE 1. Rankings of Utilities
Associated with Game
Tree Outcomes
Consumer Demands
Rank
1
2
3
4

Utility
U

5
l
U
6

U

u2

Consumer Does Not Demand
Rank
Utility
1
U U
7 8*
2
3
U U
3 4*
4
•Assumes the future is compressed
into a single time period.
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as does the converse outcome, U„, where the consumer purchases the
option, demands the good and the good is not supplied. They go on to
present two indifference mappings to represent the utilities associated
with these outcomes. Only one of the two mappings will exist for each
consumer depending on whether or not he demands the good. They then
devise a method to make the two indifference mappings commensurable:
"For any level of disposable income (e.g., Y ), if the individual
did not demand the good he would choose a consumption point on the
Y axis and experience a certain level of utility (e.g., Ug); if he
were to demand the good (assuming that is available [to the
individual]), he would choose a tangency point on the budget line
associated with that point, and experience a given level of
utility (e.g., U 5 ) . We assume that the alternative outcomes have
the same utility. Thus, Ufi U,-" [Cicchetti and Freeman, p. 534;
emphasis added].
We believe that the stated assumption requires the reader to make a
giant leap of faith. Although there is nothing to prevent the equality
of U, and U„, there certainly is nothing in their analysis that
guarantees it either. Hence, we question the validity of the Cicchetti
and Freeman framework and view their conclusion that option value is
greater than zero as being suspect. As Henry [1974, p. 90] noted: "It
appears that their (Cicchetti and Freeman's) result depends crucially
on the very particular way in which they 'make their utilities
commensurable' " In fact, intuitively, it makes little sense that
outcomes 5 and 8 yield the same utility. UV is the "free rider" outcome
described above, whereas U 0 derives from the consumer not purchasing the
o

option, not demanding the good, and not having it supplied. For the
utilities of these two outcomes (U5 and Ug) to be equal is as illogical
as Byerlee's conclusion that not purchasing an option, and later
demanding the good and not having it supplied, entails no loss in
utility.
Despite these problems, there were some other points made by
Cicchetti and Freeman that should be noted. First of all, they did deal
explicitly with the question of supply uncertainty, although not in a
detailed manner in the short article. They asserted that supply
uncertainty, even once the option is purchased, will reduce the option
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price, but as long as the probability of supply is greater than that of
no supply, option value will still be positive.
Second, Cicchetti and Freeman's [1971, p. 539] conclusions led
them to believe that uncertainty of demand can cause significant
distortion of the allocative process in public investments. "Thus,
where there is a large number of low probability demanders, omission of
the option value benefit and a consideration only of the consumer
surplus of the expected number of users would result in a significant
understatement of benefits."
The Cicchetti-Freeman analysis is also useful for illustrating the
importance of the assumption of risk aversion to the existence of option
value. Risk aversion implies a diminishing marginal utility of income.
Hence, the utility function, U f(y), is concave from below. Concavity
of the utility function is a sufficient condition for option value to
be positive in the Cicchetti-Freeman model. That is, the maximum option
price will exceed the expected value of consumer's surplus if the
individual acts in a risk averse manner. On the other hand, if the
individual is risk neutral (utility function is linear), option value
is equal to zero. Finally, if the individual is a risk seeker or
gambler, the maximum option price is less than the expected value of
consumer's surplus and option value is negative.
We can summarize the conclusions reached by Byerlee and Cicchetti
and Freeman based on their respective analyses. Some of their
conclusions are consistent. For example, both agree that option value
is zero under conditions of demand certainty and when the seller charges
the perfectly discriminating price to all consumers who decide to
purchase the good. They also agree that option value is zero
(negative) if consumers are risk neutral (seekers). The major differences between the two approaches is that Cicchetti and Freeman believe
option value is always positive when individuals are risk averse and
face uncertainty of future demand. Byerlee's analysis indicates that
option value may be | 0 under these same conditions. The sign and
magnitude of option value depend upon the shape of the individual's
indifference curves and the degree of risk aversion. But we can add
risk aversion to the list of necessary conditions required for option
value to be other than zero.
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Both of the articles explain and clarify the nature of option value
and its relationship to consumer's surplus. However, we believe that
both analyses contain flaws that prevent general acceptance of either
set of conclusions. These flaws are at least partially due to the
methodological framework used in the respective analyses. Both frameworks lack an acceptable technique to describe and/or equate the
utility levels associated with the alternatives of purchasing and not
purchasing an option.
Two major challenges to the Cicchetti and Freeman article have
been presented. Schmalensee [1972] challenged the conclusion that
option value is always positive; Arrow and Lind [1970] on the other
hand, questioned the validity of the assumption of risk aversion when
estimating project benefits from a social viewpoint. We will consider
each of these below.
Schmalensee Challenge
Schmalensee adopted a state-preference framework of analysis that
included the following elements:
N--possible states or situations that may occur in the future
TT.--known probability of state i occurring
P--a state in which price of commodity X is so high that it is
generally not available
p * — a state in which price of commodity X is such that it is
generally available
S.--consumer surplus for state i if P* prevails instead of P
0P--option price individuals would be willing to pay to assure that
P* prevails (in all states) in the future
Y.--conditional incomes in state i
i

^--utility associated with state i and income Y^
Uy--marginal utility of income in state i
Given this model, option value is defined as
0V - OP
En^
Schmalensee posited some basic conditions regarding risk aversion
in this model by assuming that the individual will accept neither fair
nor unfair bets; instead, the consumer will only accept gambles that
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are biased in his favor. From this he concluded that a sufficient
condition for the individual to be risk averse at some point
([Y.], P) is ([Y.] refers to a vector of possible future incomes):
U

y ( V p ) = u y < Y j' P )
That is, the individual is risk averse at the stated point only if
the marginal utilities of all future incomes are equal at that point.
This statement serves to relate the conditional utility functions to
each other.
Schmalensee illustrated that option value may be positive or
negative using both equivalent and compensating measures of consumer
surplus; below, we develop the argument for only the equivalent
variation measure. The equivalent variation consumer's surplus (SE.)
is the amount the individual would have to be compensated to be
indifferent between P and P* in state i. More formally for a given sta
i:
U1 (Y..P*) U 1 (Y. + SE..P) (i = 1....N)
(7)

Equivalent option price (OPE) can be defined as the amount of income
that would have to be given to the consumer in every state in order to
make him indifferent between P and P*.
N
,
N
I ..y(Yn.,P*)
Z 7,-U1 (Y, + OPE, P)
(8)
1
n
1
i = 1
i= 1 n
and equivalent option value (OVE) is:
N
OVE = OPE
Z ir.SE.
(9)
i 1 1 1
With these definitions, Schmalensee shows that OVE is non-positive
when the individual is risk averse at the state (Y. + OPE, P) if the
equivalent variations (SE.) are not the same for all states. If they
are the same for all states, then OVE 0: i.e.,
N
,
N
Z T, U n (Y + SE..P)
Z Tr.U1 (Y, + OPE.P)
(10)
1
n
1
7
1=1
i = 1 n
Given the more realistic assumption that the SE. are not the same for
all states and the utility functions are concave, Schmalensee construct
the following inequality:

18

LSA EXPERIMENT STATION TECHNICAL BULLETIN 101
(11)
This inequality is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. MU, is
the marginal utility of income at (Y. + OPE.P). For the individual to
be risk averse by Schmalensee's definition, ML), must be the marginal
utility at all levels of income; hence we can project MU. back to the
point (Y1 + SE. ,P) and see that Ufl ^ Up, where U„ and U Q represent the
left hand and right hand side of inequality (11), respectively. The
same result is obtained if SE. is greater than OPE. That is, U F J U_.
Substituting (11) into (10) yields:

(12)

U-f(Y)

B

Figure 2. Case Where Equivalent Option Value is Non-Positive
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Substituting (10) into (12) and substracting like terms from each side
yields:
0 * Z ir.U^ (Y. + OPE.P) (SE. OPE.P)
(13)
Since iP (Yi OPE.P) is constant for all i because of the definition
of risk aversion:
N
, ,
I ir- SE. OPE > 0
\U>
i = 1

1

n

Therefore, the equivalent option value (OVE) must be non-positive in the
case where the individual is risk averse at (Y + OPE.P).
The same approach is used to demonstrate that the equivalent option
value is non-negative when the individual is risk averse at income level
(Y. + SE..P). See Figure 3. Algebraically, the result is obtained in
the same manner as above:
(15)

(Y. + SE..P)
0 I I T^.UJ (Y. + S E ^ P ) (SEi
E „ i SE i

(16)
OPE)

OPE < 0

(17)
(18)

Therefore, OVE must be non-negative when the individual is risk averse
at (Yi + S E ^ P ) .
Schmalensee [1972, pp. 816-817] shows that similar results are
obtained if compensating measures of option price, option value, and
consumer surplus are used. He concludes that the sign of option value
is indeterminate because it depends on the level of income at which the
individual is risk averse. The implication of this conclusion is that
the relative social risk of development versus preservation is
indeterminate. Hence, Schmalensee's conclusions are consistent with our
earlier observation that option value can exist for project outputs as
well as preserved environments. The sign of option value associated
with preservation depends on the relative riskiness of preservation
versus the riskiness of development.
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Figure 3. Case Where Equivalent Option Value is Non-Negative
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Since the sign of option value is indeterminate, Schmalensee
[1972, p. 823] advocates the use of expected consumer's surplus as the
appropriate measure of future benefits:
"... the expected value of consumers' surpluses ought to be
employed as the best available approximation to the sum of their
option prices, and this approximate total should be discounted at
the riskless rate of interest. Benefits will be sometimes underestimated and sometimes over-estimated with this procedure, but
there would appear to be no practical way to obtain superior
results."
Oddly enough, the only response to Schmalensee's article was a
comment by Bohm [1975] which clarified and generalized Schmalensee's
work. Bohm agreed wholeheartedly that option value may be positive,
negative or zero, and neither Schmalensee nor Bohm require the reader
to make a dramatic leap of faith such as that necessary in the
Cicchetti and Freeman rule to make alternative utility mappings
commensurable.
Schmalensee and Bohm do, however, disagree over the practical
application of the theory of option value. Schmalensee, as we noted,
believed that expected consumer surplus should be used in benefit/cost
calculations, while Bohm [1975, p. 736] says that, because we do not
know the probabilities associated with future preference states for each
consumer, that expected consumer surplus cannot be determined. "The
option price is, therefore, the only measure of the benefit side of the
investment that can conceivably be determined -- by sales of access
rights, by interviews, by government "introspection," or other imperfect
approaches."
The question arises, given a world of ideal institutions, yet a
continued lack of clairvoyance of the future, which of these two measures
would we like to obtain to measure the future benefits of a resource.
Clearly option price is the superior measure of benefits in the abstract,
as long as we are unable to completely eliminate both supply and demand
uncertainty and we accept the assumption of risk aversion. Expected
consumer surplus will, as Schmalensee pointed out, tend to either
over-estimate or under-estimate benefits.
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The Nature of Risk Aversion: The Arrow and Lind Contribution
The option value identified by Byerlee, Cicchetti and Freeman, and
Schmalensee is a risk aversion premium. However, it is not clear that
this is an appropriate assumption in the evaluation of major public
investment projects from a social perspective. Arrow and Lind [1970]
showed that the costs of risk bearing are near zero when they are
spread over a large number of people as in the case with a public
investment project. Thus, although individuals may be seen as risk
averse in this context, society in the aggregate may be viewed as risk
neutral.
The conclusions of Arrow and Lind led Resources for the Future
staff members to question the applicability of the Cicchetti and
Freeman framework. For example, Fisher and Peterson [1976, p. 7] said,
"The Cicchetti-Freeman analysis needs to be qualified ... Without a
risk premium, we have lost our difference between option value and
consumers' surplus." Schmalensee [1972, p. 823] on the other hand,
argued that the Arrow and Lind conclusion does not undermine his
assumptions of risk aversion for public investment projects where
benefit/cost analysis would normally be employed. This is because,
"... benefits from government investments typically accrue mainly to
a fraction of society, and risk-spreading arguments have little force
in such cases." The nature of risk as it relates to public investment
remains a moot point.
CONCLUSIONS
Remains of Option Value
What can we conclude from the body of literature discussed above?
Initially, Weisbrod hypothesized that option value may exist for all
goods and that a positive increment of benefits must be added to
expected consumer's surplus to account for those people who value the
option to use the resource or product in the future. Cicchetti and
Freeman presented a framework to substantiate Weisbrod's hypothesis
that option value is always positive. However, we believe their
analysis is flawed and, therefore, their conclusions are unwarranted.
Schmalensee and Bohm, on the other hand, provide a convincing argument
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that option value may be positive, negative or equal to zero even though
the two writers disagree on the practical conclusions for measuring
social benefits. Schmalensee favors the measurement of expected
consumer's surplus as a proxy for social benefits whereas Bohm favors
measurement and use of option price. We believe that option price is
the best measure of benefits for an individual in society. However,
we agree with Schmalensee that we are better able to measure expected
consumer's surplus than option price.
Option value is inevitably related to the problem of market
allocation of collective goods. In many instances this problem is due
to institutions rather than the nature of the commodity. Simply stated,
society is not willing to accept methods that exclude some people from
use of collective goods. For example, the use of many national and
state parks could be limited to those possessing options which had to
be purchased in advance. The sale of these options by the government
and allowing their subsequent market transfer would better indicate the
value individuals place upon the right to use these resources in the
future. The only barrier that exists to the measurement of the option
price of such outdoor recreational experiences is an institutional one.
Clearly we have little reason to desire that the government act as a
price discriminating monopolist in the allocation of outdoor recreational resources. But many such goods that presumably have an option value
in excess of consumer surplus could be evaluated in this way if it were
considered socially desirable.
Even if society was willing to accept methods that would allow the
measurement of option price, the Arrow and Lind analysis suggests that
the resulting values would not be appropriate for use in benefit/cost
calculations. Option value is a premium that assumes individuals are
risk averse. Arrow and Lind show that risk is inversely related to the
number of people who enjoy the benefits and who pay the costs. Since
costs and benefits are often spread over many people in society the
risk encountered by any one individual is very small. The total risk
to society also decreases as risks are spread over more people. Thus,
Arrow and Lind argue that society should assume a risk neutral posture
in estimating social benefits and costs. This eliminates the risk
aversion condition required for option value to be non-zero. However,
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Schmalensee argues that the benefits of public investments are often
localized and thus these risk-spreading arguments are not relevant.
Thus, it appears we are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, option
price seems to be the theoretically superior measure of benefits for an
individual in society who exhibits risk-averse behavior. On the other
hand, risk aversion may not be an appropriate assumption when
calculating social benefits. Furthermore, we are pessimistic about our
ability to effectively determine the sign and magnitude of option value
even if option value was an appropriate measure to include in benefit/
cost studies. Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that adjustments
for option value are not possible and/or warranted in the calculation
of social benefits and costs.
Beyond Pure Option Value
If the demise of pure option value in benefit/cost studies has not
yet been publicly acknowledged, there is tacit recognition of this fact
in the development of the concept of "quasi-option value." Arrow and
Fisher [1974], Fisher and Krutilla [1974], and Henry [1974] all pointed
out that when a development of a natural resource entails irreversibilities and/or information from the present period will lead to a better
understanding of the costs and benefits of future development the, "...
net benefits from developing the area are reduced and, broadly speaking,
less of the area should be developed" [Arrow and Fisher 1974, p. 314].
As Fisher and Krutilla [1974, p. 97] said a "... conservative policy
toward development is indicated in such a circumstance." Hence, the
irreversible nature of some decisions and the potential for improved
information for making these decisions in the future are sufficient for
the existence of quasi-option value.
Irreversibility, with the exception of the loss of species, is a
relative concept and is a function of time and price. There is a
threshold of cost and time beyond which we consider the action to be
irreversible, even though in strictest terms the action is reversible.
Thus, the destruction of a redwood forest is different from the
destruction of the last redwood seed. But we consider the forest's
destruction as irreversible for all practical purposes. This extreme
case is easy to agree upon on practical grounds. There are certainly
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less extreme cases in which the distinction between reversible and
irreversible actions is less clear to all.
A detailed discussion of quasi-option value will not be presented
here. However, it is clearly related to the option value identified
by Weisbrod. For example, weisbrod's condition that the prohibitively
high cost of reinitiating production of a good or resource once it has
been stopped can be construed to be equivalent to an irreversible action.
Furthermore, it would seem that uniqueness of the good or resource will
have an important influence on both option value and quasi-option value.
However, we believe that the term "quasi-option value' has created some
confusion concerning its relationship to option value. We agree with
Henry [1974, p. 90] who suggests that the value associated with
irreversible decisions should be labeled the "irreversibility effect"
rather than quasi-option value.
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